“Iis a rationally necessary pre-requisite that in order to properly form a judgement regarding the properties of the objects of knowledge and of the world, one must first conceive of them, and know what it is that one is forming a judgement about. Accordingly, definition lies at the heart of human knowledge, resting on first principles, and being the root of the other half of human knowledge: propositions.”
Definition as a Manifestation of Realist
Metaphysics
This research explores and defends the real, essentialist claim to knowledge of things via definition. Its conclusion has a classical and contemporary import. Late classical theologians upheld the capacity of definitions to capture the essential realities of things while being fallible. This is understood in that definition is formally valid speculative inquiry, while the material for a given definiendum may be wanting. In terms of contemporary dominantly empiricist or subjectivist and ultimately nominalist dominant schools, it is shown that the favoured scientific properties do not fulfill criteria for intelligibility. Some models uniting so-called empirical data with intelligibility and ultimately a metaphysical framework are explored. The thesis of real, essentialist, and quidditative knowledge has been explored in a number of academic contexts, but the late kalām and Akbarian materials for this discussion were simply missing at the onset of this research. Thus, the remainder of this paper unfolds the excavated sophisticated traditions, making some references to nominalist practices which, by contrast, dominate scientific and dictionary practice. This research sets the stage for an engagement with empiricist and idealist philosophies by exploring the production of the materials of definition through the senses and inner senses, but the full engagement is beyond the remit of the current project.
(Paper forthcoming)